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Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution
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The Twenty-first Amendment (Amendment XXI) to the United States Constitution repealed the Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which had mandated nationwide Prohibition.
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[edit] Text
| “ | Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.
Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress. |
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[edit] Background
The Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution had ushered in a period of time known as "Prohibition", during which the manufacture, distribution, and sale of alcoholic beverages was illegal. Passage of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1919 was the crowning achievement of the temperance movement, but it soon proved highly unpopular. As more and more Americans opposed the Eighteenth Amendment, movement grew for repeal. However, repeal was complicated by grassroots politics. Although the US Constitution provides two methods for ratifying constitutional amendments, only one method had been used until then; that was for ratification by the state legislatures of three-fourths of the states. However, the wisdom of the day was that the state legislators of many states were either beholden to or simply fearful of the temperance lobby. For that reason, when Congress formally proposed the repeal of Prohibition on February 20, 1933, (with the requisite two-thirds having voted in favor in each house; 63 to 21 in the Senate and 289 to 121 in the House) they chose the other ratification method: state conventions. To date, the twenty-first is the only amendment ratified by that process.
The Twenty-first Amendment is also one of only two operative provisions of the Constitution which prohibit private conduct; the other is the Thirteenth Amendment. As Laurence Tribe points out: "there are two ways, and only two ways, in which an ordinary private citizen ... can violate the United States Constitution. One is to enslave someone, a suitably hellish act. The other is to bring a bottle of beer, wine, or bourbon into a State in violation of its beverage control laws—an act that might have been thought juvenile, and perhaps even lawless, but unconstitutional?"[1]
[edit] Proposal and ratification
The Congress proposed the Twenty-first Amendment on February 20, 1933.[2]
The proposed Amendment was fully ratified on December 5, 1933. It is the only Amendment thus far ratified by state conventions, specially selected for the purpose, whereas all other amendments have been ratified by state legislatures. It is also the only amendment that was passed for the explicit and nearly sole purpose of repealing an earlier amendment to the Constitution. The 21st amendment ended national prohibition in early December.
The following states ratified the amendment:
- Michigan (April 10, 1933)
- Wisconsin (April 25, 1933)
- Rhode Island (May 8, 1933)
- Wyoming (May 25, 1933)
- New Jersey (June 1, 1933)
- Delaware (June 24, 1933)
- Indiana (June 26, 1933)
- Massachusetts (June 26, 1933)
- New York (June 27, 1933)
- Illinois (July 10, 1933)
- Iowa (July 10, 1933)
- Connecticut (July 11, 1933)
- New Hampshire (July 11, 1933)
- California (July 24, 1933)
- West Virginia (July 25, 1933)
- Arkansas (August 1, 1933)
- Oregon (August 7, 1933)
- Alabama (August 8, 1933)
- Tennessee (August 11, 1933)
- Missouri (August 29, 1933)
- Arizona (September 5, 1933)
- Nevada (September 5, 1933)
- Vermont (September 23, 1933)
- Colorado (September 26, 1933)
- Washington (October 3, 1933)
- Minnesota (October 10, 1933)
- Idaho (October 17, 1933)
- Maryland (October 18, 1933)
- Virginia (October 25, 1933)
- New Mexico (November 2, 1933)
- Florida (November 14, 1933)
- Texas (November 24, 1933)
- Kentucky (November 27, 1933)
- Ohio (December 5, 1933)
- Pennsylvania (December 5, 1933)
- Utah (December 5, 1933)
Ratification was completed on December 5, 1933. The amendment was subsequently ratified by the following states:
- Maine (December 6, 1933)
- Montana (August 6, 1934)
In addition, the following state rejected the amendment:
- South Carolina (December 4, 1933)
North Carolina voters rejected a convention to consider the amendment on November 7, 1933 The following states have not ratified the amendment:
- Nebraska
- Kansas
- Mississippi
- Oklahoma
- Louisiana
- North Dakota
- South Dakota
- Georgia
[edit] Implementation
[edit] State and local control
The second section bans the importation of alcohol in violation of state or territorial law. This has been interpreted to give states essentially absolute control over alcoholic beverages, and many U.S. states still remained "dry" (with state prohibition of alcohol) long after its ratification. (Mississippi was the last, remaining dry until 1966;[citation needed] Kansas continued to prohibit public bars until 1987).[citation needed] Many states now delegate the authority over alcohol granted to them by this Amendment to their municipalities or counties (or both), which has led to many lawsuits over First Amendment rights when local governments have tried to revoke liquor licenses.
[edit] Court rulings
Court rulings involving this amendment have been rare. Early rulings suggested that section 2 enabled states to legislate with exceptionally broad constitutional powers. In State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co. (1936),[3] the Supreme Court recognized that "Prior to the Twenty-first Amendment it would obviously have been unconstitutional"[4] for a state to require a license and fee in order to import beer anywhere within its borders. First, the Court held that Section 2 abrogated the right to import intoxicating liquors free of a direct burden on interstate commerce, which otherwise would have been unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause before passage of the Twenty-First Amendment.[5] In its second holding, the Court rejected an equal protection claim because "A classification recognized by the Twenty-first Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by the Fourteenth."[6] Over time, the Court has significantly curtailed this initial interpretation of the Amendment.
In Craig v. Boren (1976), the Supreme Court found that analysis under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had not been affected by the passage of the Twenty-first Amendment. Although the Court did not specify whether the Twenty First Amendment could provide an exception to any other constitutional protections outside of the Commerce Clause, it acknowledged "the relevance of the Twenty-first Amendment to other constitutional provisions becomes increasingly doubtful."[7] Likewise, it has been held that the Twenty-First Amendment does not affect the Supremacy Clause[8] or the Establishment Clause.[9] However, the Craig v. Boren Court did distinguish two characteristics of state laws permitted by the Amendment, which otherwise might have run afoul of the Constitution. The constitutional issues in each centered or touched upon: (1)"importation of intoxicants, a regulatory area where the State's authority under the Twenty-first Amendment is transparently clear[10];" and (2) "purely economic matters that traditionally merit only the mildest review under the Fourteenth Amendment." [11] As to the Dormant Commerce Clause in particular, the Court clarified that, while not a pro tanto repeal, the Twenty-First Amendment nonetheless "primarily created an exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause."[12]
In South Dakota v. Dole (1987), the Supreme Court upheld the withholding of some federal highway funds to South Dakota because they allowed 3.2% beer to be sold to some adults under the age of 21. In a 7–2 decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the offer of benefits is not coercion that inappropriately invades state sovereignty. Justice O'Connor dissented, arguing that the relationship between the highway funds and the drinking age regulation was too attenuated.
In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island (1996) the Court held states cannot use the Twenty-First Amendment to abridge freedom of speech protections under the First Amendment.[13] The State of Rhode Island imposed a law which prohibited advertisements disclosing the retail prices of alcoholic beverages sold to the public. In declaring the law unconstitutional, the Court reiterated that "although the Twenty-first Amendment limits the effect of the dormant Commerce Clause on a State's regulatory power over the delivery or use of intoxicating beverages within its borders, the Amendment does not license the States to ignore their obligations under other provisions of the Constitution." [14]
Most recently, however, Granholm v. Heald (2005), held that the Twenty-first Amendment does not overrule the Dormant Commerce Clause with respect to alcohol sales, and that therefore states must treat in-state and out-of-state wineries equally. The Court criticized its earliest rulings on the issue, (including State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co.) and promulgated its most limited interpretation to date:
The aim of the Twenty-first Amendment was to allow States to maintain an effective and uniform system for controlling liquor by regulating its transportation, importation, and use. The Amendment did not give States the authority to pass nonuniform laws in order to discriminate against out-of-state goods, a privilege they had not enjoyed at any earlier time. [15]
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the plain meaning of Section 2 removed "any doubt regarding its broad scope, the Amendment simplified the language of the Webb-Kenyon Act and made clear that States could regulate importation destined for in-state delivery free of negative Commerce Clause restraints."[16] In his historical account, Justice Thomas argued the early precedent provided by State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co. was indeed correct, and furthered the original intent of the Twenty-First Amendment to provide a constitutional guarantee authorizing state regulation that might conflict with the Dormant Commerce Clause (similar to the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913; 27 U.S.C. §122). Regardless of the narrow 5-4 majority, the ruling in Granholm v. Heald will likely control Dormant Commerce Clause analysis for the foreseeable future, given the unusual ideological shift by some of the justices in that case. As of the present, each associate justice who voted with the majority remains on the Court. Although Justice Stevens voted with the traditionally conservative wing of the Court, Justices Kennedy and Scalia both voted with the traditionally liberal wing of the Court.
[edit] See also
[edit] References
- ^ Laurence H. Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution Without Really Trying: Lessons from the Repeal of Prohibition to the Balanced Budget Amendment, 12 Const. Comm. 217, 219 (1995).
- ^ Mount, Steve (January 2007). "Ratification of Constitutional Amendments". Retrieved on February 24, 2007.
- ^ 299 U.S. 59, 57 S. Ct. 77, 81 L. Ed. 38. A copy of the full opinion can be found at "State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co.". Justia.com. Retrieved on November 25, 2008.
- ^ 299 U.S. 59, 62(1936)
- ^ 299 U.S. 59, 64(1936)
- ^ 299 U.S. 59, 64 (1936)
- ^ 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976)
- ^ California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 112-114 (1980)
- ^ Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122, n. 5 (1982)
- ^ 429 U.S. 190, 207 (1976) (citing Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.377 U.S. 324, 330 and n.9 (1964)
- ^ 429 U.S. 190, 207 (1976) (citing Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hostetter, 384 U.S. 35, 47-48, 50-51 (1966); and Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955)) (emphasis added).
- ^ 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976) (citing Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 330 & 322 (1964); Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131, 139-140 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Finch & Co. v. McKittrick, 305 U.S. 395, 398 (1939); Department of Revenue v. James Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341 (1964); and Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938)) (emphasis added).
- ^ 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996)
- ^ 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996) (quoting Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 712 (1984)) (quotation omitted).
- ^ 544 U.S. 460, 484-485 (2005)
- ^ 544 U.S. 460, 514 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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